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Context: Robotic surgical systems are intended to enable surgeons to perform minimally invasive 
operations with increased vision, precision, dexterity, and control, and to reduce the rate of injuries, blood 
loss, length of hospital stay, and post-operative complications. However, an increasing number of adverse 
events, in which injuries and deaths occurred during or after robotic procedures, have been reported. 
 
Objectives: To assess the safety and effectiveness of existing robotic systems in performing different 
types of minimally invasive procedures by studying the robotic surgery incidents that led to prolonged 
procedures, patient complications, injuries, and deaths. 
   
Data Sources: Recalls and adverse events reported to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration  
(FDA) between January 2000 and December 2012, collected from two public FDA databases: the 
Medical and Radiation Emitting Device Recalls (“recalls”) database and the Manufacturer and User 
Facility Device Experience (“MAUDE”) database.   
 
Analysis Methodology: Using an automated natural language processing tool, trained with domain-
specific dictionaries of relevant keywords and part-of-speech and negation taggers, we analyzed the Event 
Type, Patient Outcome, Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields of the adverse event reports 
as well as the technical problems and corresponding recovery actions taken by the company, provided by 
the recalls. We extracted the rates and patient outcomes of the adverse events, most common types and 
number of device and instrument malfunctions, and the number of procedures converted to traditional 
techniques or rescheduled to be done at a later time, across different classes of surgery. CAST, a 
sophisticated accident analysis tool was employed to systematically analyze example injury and death 
reports to identify the system hazards and potentially violated safety constraints that led to adverse events. 
 
Results: During the study period, a total of 4,798 adverse events (involving 86 deaths, 410 patient 
injuries, and 3405 device malfunctions) and 19 recalls issued by the company (involving 109,709 devices 
and instruments) were reported to the FDA. The rate of adverse event reports on average is declining, but 
an overall increasing trend in the rate of injury and death reports can be observed since 2004, going from 
13 reports per 100,000 procedures in 2004 to about 50 in 2012. In 4,382 cases (91.3%), a device or 
instrument malfunction occurred, such as parts of the device or burnt/broken pieces of instruments falling 
into the patient, electrical arcing of instruments, system errors or video/imaging problems, and unintended 
operation of instruments. In 275 (5.7%) of the adverse events, the system was restarted to troubleshoot the 
problems; in about 640 (13.3%) cases, the procedure was completed non-robotically through conversion 
to traditional techniques such as open or laparoscopic; and in 236 cases (4.9%) it was rescheduled to a 
later time. Causal Analysis using System Theory (CAST) helped us to determine that the likely causes for 
many of the accidents include inadequacy of safety controls, absence of comprehensive warnings to the 
surgeon, limited safety and training practices, lack of user certification, and limited surgical experience.  
 
Conclusions: Despite the increasing number of procedures being done with the da Vinci surgical system, 
a significant number of malfunctions and system downtimes with potentially adverse impacts on patients 
are being experienced. Better dissemination of this information may allow a more measured evaluation of 
the role of da Vinci robotic systems especially in performing complex procedures. Adoption and use of 
state-of-the-art safety engineering techniques for accident analysis and design with existing robotic 
technology may reduce the adverse event rates in future safety-critical systems for robotic surgery. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, concerns regarding the safety and effectiveness of robot-assisted surgeries have heightened 
because of the increased number of adverse events associated with the surgical robots, as reported to the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)  [1] [2] [3]. In part, this rise is due to the exponential increase in 
the number of robotic procedures over the last decade: In 2012, around 450,000 robotic procedures were 
performed in hospitals worldwide with an installed base of 2,585 robotic systems  [4] [5] [6].  
This study focuses on the analysis of adverse events and recalls of da Vinci surgical systems, the only 
existing FDA-approved robotic system for minimally invasive surgery. Our study spans all the reports 
collected by the FDA over a period of 13 years from 2000 to 2012  [7]. We studied patient outcomes and 
causes of adverse events reported for different classes and types of surgeries as well as the recalls issued 
by the manufacturing company. While previous work has reported on subsets of the adverse events data 
and the experiences of different institutions with the robot, this is the only large-scale study of adverse 
events, including 4,798 reports, and all the recalls of robotic surgical systems, which in total affected 
nearly 3,741 devices and 105,968 instruments on the market. 
In our study, we followed the FDA guidelines on using the MAUDE data
1
  [8], and augmented the adverse 
events data with the recalls data, as well as knowledge of the system and discussions with expert surgeons 
who have extensively used the robotic system in general, urologic, and cardiothoracic surgical procedures. 
Specifically, we used the factual data on deaths, injuries, and robot malfunctions, combined with the 
technical problems and corresponding recovery actions taken by the company (provided by the recalls), 
together with systematic accident analysis using a tool called CAST. We extracted valuable information 
on the potential causes of robotic accidents in order to understand the effectiveness of using robotic 
devices for different minimally invasive procedures. We provide insights on the use of existing state-of-
the-art technologies for enhancing safety controls in future robotic surgical systems.  
The main contributions of the paper are as follows: 
 Studying the device malfunctions and recalls of the robotic systems, including system errors and 
broken pieces of instruments that caused interruption of procedures or conversion/rescheduling  
 Studying the effectiveness of robotic systems across different classes of surgery in terms of rate of 
injuries, deaths, device malfunctions, conversions, and rescheduling, as well as a comparison to 
laparoscopic and open surgery. 
 Identifying examples of inadequate safety mechanisms in the system by analysis of example injury 
and death reports using CAST, a sophisticated accident analysis tool for safety-critical systems. 
                                                        
1 According to the FDA and several studies in the literature  [9] [10] [11], the MAUDE database may not provide an accurate 
representation of true rates and severity of adverse events due to underreporting, and incomplete, inconsistent, and duplicate 
reports submitted by volunteer reporters. But the reported malfunctions, injuries, and deaths are valuable data if treated as a 
sample of real adverse events that occurred during robotic procedures and affected the safety of patients. 
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 Providing examples of the state-of-the-art techniques for modeling, accident analysis, and safety-
based design, which, if combined with existing robotic technology, will improve the safety of 
future surgical systems. 
In the next section we present the data analysis methodology and the results. 
 
II. DATA ANALYSIS  
The data from the FDA MAUDE and recalls databases  [7] were analyzed using MedSafe, a framework 
for automated extraction and analysis of medical device safety reports, based on the flow presented 
in  [12]. MedSafe first uses several filters to remove non-essential terms and phrases as well as redundant 
records from the extracted reports. Then it employs a natural language processing engine that uses several 
domain-specific dictionaries (e.g. keywords related to surgical instruments, malfunction types, and 
surgery classes) as well as parts-of-speech, negation, and temporal taggers to extract semantic and timing 
information from the reports. The results from MedSafe were continually tested for accuracy and validity 
both from the systems and the medical perspectives. Figure A1 (Appendix) shows the overall MedSafe 
analysis flow. The specifics of analysis performed at each step are given in the following sections. 
 
1) Frequency of Adverse Events and Their Patient Impact: Using MedSafe we first extracted all 
the reports related to “da vinci” and “intuitive surgical” by searching for the related terms in the Device 
Name and Manufacturer Name fields of over 2.5 million adverse events reported to the FDA from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2012. That led us to an initial list of 4,930 adverse event reports, from 
which we filtered out those with duplicate database keys (reporting the same adverse event for multiple 
devices) and those that were reported before 2013, but were received by the FDA in 2013. The final list 
contained 4,798 reports including both reports on the da Vinci system itself and on its accessories 
manufactured by either Intuitive Surgical, Inc. (98.9%) or other companies (0.6%). Via a detailed review 
of the Event Type, Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields of these reports, we extracted 
four types of adverse events reported to the FDA: device malfunctions, injuries, deaths, and other: 
Device Malfunctions: Over 3400 of the reported adverse events (71%) involved device malfunctions, 
such as broken or burnt pieces of instruments, system error codes, arcing of instruments, and unintended 
instrument movements. Those malfunctions often required the surgical staff to spend additional time on 
troubleshooting the errors, retrieving the broken pieces from the patient's body, or, in extreme cases, 
converting the procedure to a non-robotic (laparoscopic or open) surgery. To varying degrees, all these 
actions prolonged the procedures, as discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Injuries and Deaths: About 500 of the reports (10.3%) indicated significant negative patient impacts 
including injuries (410 cases) and deaths (86 cases). About 103 (2.3%) of the adverse events that were 
reported as Malfunction or Other were indeed injuries. MedSafe identified these reports by searching the 
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Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields using keywords related to different types of patient 
complications. Some example keywords in our dictionary include “injury,” “bleeding,” “burns,” “cuts,” 
“puncture,” or “damage of organ”. In addition, we found three events reported as an Injury, that their 
description explicitly mentioned no injuries occurred, and one Injury that later led to patient Death.  
Other: For the rest of the adverse events (897 cases), information on the type of event either was not 
available or was indicated by the reporters as Other. Using MedSafe we found that a major part of these 
events (721 reports) were related to system errors that interrupted the procedure, broken instruments that 
fell into the patient's body, or video/imaging problems at the surgeon’s console (See Table I).  
 
Figure 1 – Number of da Vinci Adverse Event Reports and Average Rate of Reports per Procedure: X axis corresponds to the 
year the report was received by the FDA. Numbers on the bars indicate number of deaths reported per year. The secondary Y 
axis shows the rates of adverse events per procedure. 
Rate of Adverse Events: Figure 1 (primary vertical axis) plots the frequency of adverse events versus 
time based on the year that reports were received by the FDA. We see that the total number of adverse 
events reported for the da Vinci system and its instruments has linearly increased, going from 67 reports 
in 2001 to 1043 in 2012. This observation can be partly explained by the exponentially increasing use of 
da Vinci surgical systems in the US and worldwide. 
We calculated the rate of adverse events reported per procedure for each year, by dividing the number of 
adverse events by an estimated
2
 number of annual procedures performed in the U.S., extracted from the 
company investor presentations  [5]. The trend lines in Figure 1 (secondary vertical axis) show the rate of 
                                                        
2 We estimated the number of annual procedures performed in the U.S., by measuring the bars displayed on the graphs in the 
investor presentations (from 2009 to 2013). Whenever the estimated numbers from two different presentations didn't match, we 
assumed the maximum number of procedures for that year.   
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adverse events per procedure based on both the year the events occurred and the year they were received 
by the FDA. We observe that the trend in overall rate of adverse events is decreasing (going from about 
0.0118 in 2004 to 0.0028 in 2012). Similar decreasing trends for the rate of adverse events are shown in 
recent statements made by Intuitive Surgical, Inc. for the period of 2010–2013  [13]. However, our longer-
term analysis of the reports over the 8-year period of 2004–2012 (Figure 2) shows that the trend of 
injuries and deaths on average is increasing, with a fivefold increase from 0.00013 reports per procedure 
in 2004 to 0.00050 in 2012. These increasing trends cannot be observed in the manufacturer’s statements 
because of their inadequate scaling of figures and the fact that the analysis was limited to a short period of 
three years.  
 
Figure 2 - Average Number of Injuries and Deaths Reported per Procedure, by the dates of event and report received by FDA  
Intuitive Surgical, Inc. claims that the recent rise (from 2011 to 2012) in the number of adverse event 
reports is due to a change in their medical device reporting (MDR) practice that happened in September 
2012, and the majority of recent reports are related to the robot accessories (e.g. cable breaks) and not the 
core system itself  [14]. But a closer look at the long-term trends shows that sudden changes in failure 
frequencies have also occurred in the past (from 2006 to 2007). Further, if the surgical system is 
considered as both the control system and its instruments then any failures of the instruments and 
accessories also affects the system operation. Additionally, we believe that state-of-the-art sensing 
technology allows both the detection of instrument failures and their proactive reporting to the surgical 
team in a timely fashion. Logging and reporting of such conditions by the system allow early diagnosis, 
repair, and replacements. 
We can make two important observations based on these results: First, despite a relatively high number of 
adverse events reports, the vast majority of procedures were successful and did not involve any problems, 
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which can be seen by calculating the rate of adverse events per procedure, shown in Figures 1 and 2. That 
finding is also confirmed by many surgeons who routinely use the robot in general, urologic, and 
gynecologic surgeries. Nevertheless, an important question is whether robotic surgery is substantially 
better than laparoscopy, especially for complex types of procedures in cardiothoracic and head and neck. 
The evidence to answer this question is discussed further in subsection 4, where we show a comparison of 
outcomes between robotic versus traditional laparoscopic and open surgery found in the literature. In the 
next subsection, we present a more detailed discussion of the device malfunctions and their impact.  
 
2) Impact of Device and Instrument Malfunctions: In order to understand the impact of device and 
instrument malfunctions in terms of procedure time and patient complications, we performed a detailed 
analysis of the Event Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields of the reports, including those that 
were not indicated by the reporters as a device malfunction.  
Table I - Major Categories of Malfunctions Reported (Event Types: Malfunction (M), Injury (IN), Death (D), and Other (O)) 
Malfunction 
Category 
Description 
No. of 
Reports 
(% of all) 
Malfunction Impact (% of cat.) Event Type  
System 
Reset 
Surgery 
Converted 
Surgery 
Rescheduled 
M IN D O 
System  
Errors 
- System error codes and faults 
- System transferred into a recoverable or 
non-recoverable safety state 
473 
(9.9%) 
194 
(41.0%) 
305 
(64.5%) 
121 
(25.6%) 
28 16 0 429 
Broken 
Instruments,  
Fell-Into Cases 
- Burnt/Broken parts and components 
- Fell into the surgical field or body cavity 
- Required additional procedure time to be 
found/ removed from the patient. 
1,940 
(40.4%) 
13 
(0.7%) 
82 
(4.2%) 
15 
(0.8%) 
1,783 55 0 102 
Burns/Holes in 
Tip Covers, 
Elec. Arcing 
- Tears, burns, splits, or holes on tip cover 
- Electrical arcing, sparking, charring 
917 
(19.1%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
16 
(1.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
760 130 0 27 
Unintended 
Instrument 
Operation 
- Unintended or unstoppable movements 
started without the surgeon’s command  
- Instruments not working, open/closed 
- Instruments not recognized by the system 
424 
(8.8%) 
24 
(5.7%) 
66 
(15.6%) 
17 
(4.0%) 
316 36 2 70 
Video/Imaging  
Problems 
- Loss of video  
- Display of blurry images at the surgeon’s 
console or assistant’s touchscreen 
200 
(4.2%) 
44 
(22.0%) 
111 
(55.5%) 
74 
(37.0%) 
14 4 0 182 
Other 
- Electrosurgical unit malfunctions, etc. 
- Other events reported as Malfunction 
813 
(16.9%) 
8 
(1.0%) 
14 
(1.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
790 23 0 0 
Total 
Malfunctions 
- All the malfunctions found by MedSafe 
4,382 
(91.3%) 
247 
(5.1%) 
526 
(11.0%) 
204 
(4.3%) 
3,405 254 2 721 
Total Reports - All the adverse events reported 
4,798 
(100%) 
275 
(5.7%) 
640 
(13.3%) 
236 
(4.9%) 
3,405 410 86 897 
MedSafe was trained by domain-specific dictionaries to search for different malfunction categories. Parts-
of-speech and negation taggers were used to infer semantics from the sentences and filter out the cases 
where the keywords were not used in the intended pattern and context. Table A1 (Appendix) shows 
examples of malfunctions reported in different cardiothoracic surgeries and their effect on patients (minor 
injuries or burns), extracted using a dictionary of keywords built based on the online Instrument 
Accessories catalog of Intuitive Surgical  [15]. Table I shows five major categories of malfunctions 
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identified by MedSafe, along with their descriptions, number of reports in each category, the impact on 
procedure, and the event types as reported to the FDA. Note that the failure categories are not mutually 
exclusive and in many cases two or three different malfunctions were reported in one event. Figures A4 
and A5 (Appendix) use Venn diagrams to depict the intersection between different malfunction categories 
and impacts. The Other category includes other kinds of malfunctions that couldn't be classified in any of 
the classes. Table A2 (Appendix) lists all the system error codes that we extracted from the reports, along 
with their description by the company and the number of adverse events that involved each type of error. 
The following are our major findings based on these results (refer to Table I ): 
 System errors and video/imaging problems constituted 659 (13.7%) of the adverse events and were 
the major contributors to the system resets (231 cases, 84% of all system resets), conversion of the 
procedures to a non-robotic approach (409 cases, 63.9% of all conversions), and rescheduling of 
the procedures (191 cases, 80.9% of all cases). About 91% of these events were reported as Other.  
 A major part (40.4%) of the adverse events (about 52% of all malfunction reports) were related to 
breakage or burning of a component or part of an instrument during the procedure and/or falling of 
the broken/burnt pieces or the whole instrument itself into the patient's body. In almost all those 
cases the procedure was interrupted, and the surgical team spent some time retrieving the pieces 
from the body; in 55 cases, a patient injury was reported. 
 About 917 reports (19.1% of the adverse events) were related to burns and holes that developed in 
the tip cover accessories and electrical arcing, sparking, or charring of instruments, which led to 
nearly 130 injuries, such as burning of the tissue under surgery.  
 Unintended operation of instruments, such as uncontrolled movements and powering on/off by 
themselves, happened in 424 of the adverse events (8.8%), including 36 injuries and 2 deaths. 
In total, we found 4,382 reports on problems that occurred during surgery, including 721 cases that were 
reported as the “Other” type of event but were actually related to system errors, video/imaging problems, 
broken parts, and unintended operation of instruments. About 275 (5.7%) of the adverse events involved 
system resets; in about 640 (13.3%) cases, the procedure was completed non-robotically through 
conversion to traditional techniques such as open or laparoscopic surgery; and in 236 (4.9%) cases the 
procedure was rescheduled to a later time. That means that in 912 cases (19% of all the adverse events), 
the procedure was interrupted and time was spent on troubleshooting the errors, identifying whether the 
error was actually recoverable or non-recoverable through resetting of the system, or converting the 
procedure to a traditional technique. If we assume that in each case a minimum of 15 minutes was needed 
to restart the procedure
3
, this translates to about 228 hours of downtime and unavailability of the system. 
                                                        
3 For example in the MAUDE report shown in Table A5 (Appendix), half-an-hour was spent only for troubleshooting a system 
error code, and then the surgeon decided to convert the procedure. 
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3) Reasons for Recalls and Recovery Actions: We extracted 19 recalls of the da Vinci surgical 
system and instruments reported to the FDA from January 2000 to December 2012 ‎[7]. While only a 
small number of recalls were issued by the company over the years
4
, they impacted a large number of 
devices (109,709 devices and instruments) on the market. Moreover, important insights into the safety 
issues of the robot can be extracted from the recalls, because the data include the actual technical 
problems confirmed by the manufacturing company that may present potential harm to patients, as well as 
the recovery actions taken by the company to address the failures.   
 
Table II and Table A3 (Appendix) list all the recalls of the da Vinci (S) Endoscopic Instrument Control 
System and accessories; we further classified the recalls, based on their reasons, into four categories of 
software, electrical, computer control, and mechanical problems. The following are our findings: 
 Of all the recalls, 10 were reported for the robot’s control system, affecting about 3,741 systems 
on the market, while the rest (9 out of 19) were related to accessories and instruments used with 
the robot, affecting about 105,968 devices.   
 The majority (7 out of 10) of control system recalls (Table II) were due to computer- and 
electrical-related malfunctions (affecting 1568 devices), but the recalls due to mechanical 
malfunctions (3 out of 10) affected a larger number of devices (2173) on the market.  
 The problems with the robot control system were often handled at a very high cost to both the 
manufacturer and the hospitals:  
o Software and mechanical issues were addressed by sending field system engineers to all the 
locations to update or repair the systems (in about 1,500 devices).  
o Hospitals were advised to have backup equipment and instrumentation available and to be 
prepared to convert to alternative surgical techniques (mentioned in  [16] and in the system's 
user manual, according to  [17]), costing about $2 million per back-up device and instruments. 
The manufacturer's recommendations that providers continue using the device until the corrective system 
updates or service visits are made (e.g. for recall numbers Z-2204-2008 and Z-2930-2011) and that they 
use the backup systems in the case of failures, do not reflect advisable practices. Many of the reported 
failures might be repeatable and in the time until the service visit, there is potential for system downtime, 
prolonged procedures, or patient injuries in all devices that are affected by the same defect (259 devices in 
these two examples). Additionally, some of the problems such as a software defect that can lock up the 
system cannot be resolved even by having redundant backup devices. It is well-understood in software 
engineering that two versions of the same software may well experience the same technical problems  [18].  
                                                        
4 After the concerns raised by the FDA and the public about recent increase in the number of adverse event 
reports, the manufacturer issued 13 new recalls in the 8-month period of April-November 2013 alone. 
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Table II - Recalls of da Vinci (S) Endoscopic Instrument Control System (Years 2000-2012) 
Recall Record 
Numbers 
Device Name 
(Model Number) 
Date 
Malfunction 
Type 
Reason for Recall 
Company 
Recovery 
Action N
u
m
. 
o
f 
D
ev
ic
es
 
Z-1244-2007 
da Vinci S 
A4.3 SW 
(Model IS1200) 
Sep  
26 
2007 
Computer 
Software 
Under certain conditions, the 
product's software may crash 
and require a manual override 
or restart before functioning 
again. 
Service Visit 
+ 
Software 
Upgrade 
405 
Z-0079-2008 
da Vinci S 
(Model IS2000) 
Feb 
21 
2008 
System lock-up: Software 
anomalies could cause product 
failure during use; or on start-
up.  System transitions to a safe 
“soft-lock” state. 
Software 
Upgrade  
159 
Z-2204-2008 
da Vinci S 
(Model IS2000) 
Sep 
16 
2008 
Defective software chip may 
cause the system to fail and 
lock up. 
Urgent 
Letter +  
Replace 
Chip 
112 
Z-1245-2007 
da Vinci S 
(Model IS2000) 
(Auxiliary power 
board (APB)) 
Feb 
22 
2008 
Electrical 
Product may malfunction and 
fail to start up on AC power. 
Service Visit 38 
Z-0151-2008 
Z-0152-2008 
da Vinci S 
(Model IS2000) 
 
(Vision Cart 
Model VS2000) 
Feb 
22 
2008 
Under-rated fuses may be 
installed which will result in 
fuse failure and a loss of power 
to the vision cart and any 
ancillary equipment connected 
to it. 
Notification 
Letter 
+ 
Correction 
63 
Z-1180-2008 
da Vinci S 
(Model IS2000) 
(Revision A51_P5) 
June 
12 
2008 
Computer 
Control 
Delay in responding: In certain 
circumstances, the device may 
not respond immediately to a 
user’s command, such as master 
clutch or camera control. 
Notification 
Letter 
+ 
Correction 
9 
Z-1161-2010 
da Vinci S 
(Model IS2000) 
(Revision A51_P7) 
Apr 
05 
2010 
Gripper or scissor jaws may 
close inadvertently, and will not 
open on command, and various 
other reported modes of failure. 
Control by surgeon may fail, 
and this failure may be difficult 
to detect. 
Notification 
Letter 
+ 
Service 
Engineer 
Visit 
782 
Z-0670-2007 
da Vinci S 
4 Arm 
(Model IS2000) 
Mar 
29 
2007 
Mechanical 
Spinal pin could limit 
mechanical motion of the arm 
and make system unavailable 
for surgery. 
Rework as 
Part of 
Routine 
Service Visit 
24 
Z-2930-2011 
da Vinci Si 
(Model IS3000) 
Aug 
03 
2011 
Potential failure of the retention 
component of the Master Tool 
Manipulator (MTM) could 
cause uncontrolled movement. 
Urgent 
Correction 
Letter  
+ 
Component 
Retrofit 
183 
Z-1202-2012 
da Vinci S, 
da Vinci Si, 
da Vinci Si-e 
Mar 
13 
2012 
The holding brake may allow 
passive uncontrolled motion 
due to gravity during specific 
power-off conditions. 
Urgent 
Correction 
Letter + 
Instructions 
1966 
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Notwithstanding the fact that existing da Vinci robotic systems already have built-in safety and recovery 
mechanisms, the reported failures are identifiable single points of failures that could be prevented or 
recovered from at much lower costs and in a more timely fashion. The software lockups can be resolved 
by using a technique called rollback recovery (or check-pointing), a standard technique that have been 
shown to be effective in tolerating 70–90% of hardware and software faults  [19] [20]. Other examples 
include the use of redundant components in the system design, real-time error detection and 
reconfiguration strategies for automatic replacement of defective system components, and timely software 
updates. 
 
4) Adverse Events across Different Classes of Robotic Surgery: We extracted the class and type of 
surgeries involving adverse events by training the MedSafe parsing engine with a dictionary of keywords 
related to different surgical procedures that was built based on information provided on the website of the 
company  [21]. Table I shows the number of adverse events that happened in each class of surgery and 
their patient impacts. For the most common types of procedures in each class (highlighted in column 6 of 
Table I), we provide a comparison of the mortality, morbidity, and complication rates to those of 
laparoscopic and open surgery, based on previous studies found in the literature. Figures A2 and A3 
(Appendix) show for each class of surgery, the number of adverse events per year, and the percentage of 
cases in which the procedure was converted or rescheduled. From those results, we observe that: 
 Of all the adverse event reports, only 2,259 (47.1%) indicated the type of surgery involved; 
among those, the majority were related to gynecologic (23.1%), urologic (16.8%), and 
cardiothoracic (3.1%) surgeries, such as hysterectomy, prostatectomy, and mitral valve repair 
respectively. The higher percentage of adverse events (39.9%) in gynecologic and urologic 
surgeries could be explained by the higher number of these procedures performed. According to 
the company, in 2012 over 400,000 gynecology and urology procedures were performed 
worldwide, while the number of other surgeries altogether was less than 80,000  [5].   
 Cardiothoracic and head and neck surgeries involved a higher chance of deaths per adverse event 
report (11.6% and 17.6%, respectively) compared to gynecology and urology (2.4%). In 12 (out 
of 15) deaths reported for head and neck surgeries, the patient expired after experiencing peri-
operative bleeding or infection. However, because of inconsistent and incomplete information 
provided in the reports, it is not easy to identify the causes of the deaths. 
 A major percentage of adverse events reported for general (58.8%), gynecologic (49.5%), and 
colorectal (44.1%) surgeries were attributed to broken/fallen-into cases.  
 The highest conversion rate were for head and neck (35.3%), colorectal (26.5%) and 
cardiovascular (25.2%) procedures and the highest rates of rescheduling were for urologic 
(15.7%), head and neck (5.9%), and cardiothoracic (4.8%) surgeries. 
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Table III - Number of Adverse Events Reports in Different Surgery Classes and Comparison to Laparoscopy Surgeries  
(In the last column, OPN, LAP, and ROB, respectively, stand for open, laparoscopic and robotic types of surgery) 
Surgery Class  
Num of  
Adverse 
Events  
Num 
of  
Deaths  
Num of  
Injuries  
Num of 
Malfun
ctions  
Common Types of Surgery  
 (Number of Adverse Events) 
Ref. 
Comparison to 
Other Types of 
Surgery 
Gynecologic  
1106 
(23.1%) 
26 
(2.4%) 
191 
(17.3%) 
714 
(64.6%) 
-Hysterectomy (873) 
-Myomectomy (142) 
-Sacrocolpopexy (42) 
-Ovarian Cystectomy (6) 
 
‎[22] 
Mortality: 
ROB: 0.1% 
LAP: 0.2% 
‎[23] 
Complications: 
ROB: 5.5% 
LAP: 5.3% 
Urologic  
807 
(16.8%) 
19 
(2.4%) 
65 
(8.1%) 
413 
(51.2%) 
-Prostatectomy (709) 
-Nephrectomy (70) 
-Pyeloplasty (15) 
‎[24] 
Mortality: 
ROB: 0.8% 
OPN: 0.5% 
‎[25] 
Complications: 
ROB: 2.5-26% 
LAP: 0-25% 
Cardiothoracic  
147 
(3.1%) 
17 
(11.6%) 
32 
(21.8%) 
52 
(35.4%) 
-Mitral valve repair (32) 
-Lobectomy (31)  
-Coronary arteries bypass (20) 
‎[26] 
Complications: 
ROB: 3.2-3.8%  
OPN: 3.2% 
‎[27] 
Morbidity/ 
Mortality: 
ROB: 36.8% 
Head and Neck  
85 
(1.8%) 
15 
(17.6%) 
16 
(18.8%) 
22 
(25.9%) 
-TransOral robotic (Tors) (63)  
-Thyroidectomy (13) 
-Tongue base resection (6)  
‎[28] 
Complications: 
ROB: 11.5% 
Mortality: 
ROB: 1.5% 
‎[29] 
Complications: 
ROB: 10.1% 
Mortality: 
ROB: 0.3% 
General  
80 
(1.7%) 
2 
(2.5%) 
15 
(18.8%) 
54 
(67.5%) 
-Cholecystectomy (23) 
-Nissen fundoplication (16) 
-Cystectomy (16) 
-Gastric Bypass (12)  
‎[30] 
Complications: 
ROB: 2% 
LAP: 2% 
Colorectal  
34 
(0.7%) 
3 
(8.8%) 
7 
(20.6%) 
15 
(44.1%) 
-Colectomy (18) 
-Colon Resection (4) 
-Proctectomy (4) 
-Rectopexy (3) 
‎[31] 
Complications: 
ROB:5/17=29.4% 
LAP:2/15=13.3% 
‎[32] 
Complications: 
ROB: 14% 
LAP: 17% 
N/A 
2539 
(52.9%) 
4 
(0.2%) 
84 
(3.3%) 
2135 
(84.1%) 
   
Previous studies on the effectiveness of robotic surgery show contradictory results. Most of the studies 
especially in the classes of gynecology and urology, for which the robot is extensively used, show better 
outcomes compared to laparoscopy and open surgery in terms of rates of complications and deaths. But 
comparisons of outcomes for cardiothoracic, head and neck, and colorectal surgeries have rarely been 
done, and the existing studies often show that the robot is no more effective, or even worse, than 
laparoscopy. The best that we can assess from the available data is that the higher percentage of deaths 
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and conversions in cardiovascular, head and neck, and colorectal surgeries could be indirectly explained 
by higher complexity of the procedures, less frequent use of robotic devices, less robotic expertise in 
these fields, and complications related to patient histories, to varying degrees that are unknown. In the 
next section, we discuss some of the possible causes of deaths that were identified by detailed review of 
the reports. 
III. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
We performed a detailed review of adverse events involving injuries and deaths to find the actual number 
of reports that explicitly indicated that a device malfunction or robotic technical issue caused the harm to 
patients. Through discussions with expert surgeons as well as careful review of adverse event reports, we 
classified the things that contributed to patient injuries or deaths into three main categories: inherent 
complications of the surgery, technical issues with the robot, or mistakes made by the surgeon or staff.  
For the majority of the death reports, the cause was attributed to surgeon/staff mistake (6 out of 86), the 
patient’s history (10 out of 86), or inherent risks involved with the surgery (such as infection (6), sepsis 
(4), and bleeding (9)). Of all the reported deaths in different classes of surgery, we found that at least 
75.3% (64 of 86) happened after the procedure and at least 17.4% (15 of 86) during the procedure. Of the 
deaths that occurred during the procedures, five were due to inadvertent cuts or punctures of organs and 
the others were related to complications such as uncontrolled bleeding, pulmonary embolism, and cardiac 
arrest. We identified 17 cases of deaths that happened after the surgery because the patients were 
diagnosed with an infection and sepsis (10) or uncontrollable and heavy bleeding (7).  
Recall that of 410 injury reports, 254 involved device or instrument malfunctions (as shown in Table I). 
Of the rest (i.e., 156), in 29 cases, the manufacturer attributed the injury to user or surgeon error; in 17 
cases, improper positioning of the patient for a long time during the procedure led to post-operation 
complications (such as nerve damage or neuropathy); in 9 cases, burning near the port incision was 
reported; in 16 cases, the inherent risks of the surgery or the patient’s history were indicated as the cause 
of the event; in 6 cases, the manufacturer investigations concluded that the burning of patient tissue may 
have been caused by electrosurgical unit currents passing through the instruments to the patient, if the 
patient was not properly grounded; and in 2 cases, the surgeon felt some shocking at the surgeon’s side 
console. We believe that the events other than user errors could potentially be prevented by improved 
safety controls in the design of systems.  
The rest of the events, including 77 injury and 27 death reports, could not be classified in any of the 
categories. These reports provided little or no detailed information about the possible causes that led to 
the events or insights on how such catastrophic events could be prevented in the future. Table A4 
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(Appendix) shows a few representative example death events reported in recent years to the FDA, along 
with summaries of their descriptions, types of surgery, and the potential causes of the death that can be 
identified from the descriptions provided in the reports.  
We employed a sophisticated accident analysis tool for safety-critical systems, called Causal Analysis 
using System Theory (CAST) ‎[33], for more detailed review and analysis of example accidents. While 
such an external review cannot determine exactly what was involved in the actual incidents that occurred, 
it can provide insight on the potential hazards and their causes involved in such robotic surgeries and 
potential factors to explore in examining specific incidents.  
We first identified the main entities involved in a robotic-assisted surgical system, including the human 
operators (surgeons, surgical staff, and technical support engineers), the automated controllers and 
components of the robot, and the patient. Then using the semantics of STAMP (Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes) ‎[33], we modeled the hierarchical control structure of a typical robotic 
surgical system, composed of the main controllers (human operators and automated robot control), the 
controlled processes (robotic arms and the patient), and the control loops (See Figure 3.a). In this 
structure, the interactions between the controllers and controlled processes are modeled by control loops 
composed of the commands (e.g., hand and foot movements) that a controller (e.g., main surgeon) sends 
to a controlled process (e.g., robot control) and the response or feedback (e.g., 3D images on the surgeon's 
console) received from the controlled process. 
Using CAST, the characteristics and responsibilities of each of the controllers, the interactions among 
them, and the context in which they make decisions and take actions were analyzed to uncover potential 
safety hazards and violated safety constraints and to identify safety controls that should be added to the 
design of system. Note that our analysis is limited to the incomplete information provided in the Event 
Description and Manufacturer Narrative fields of MAUDE reports. Careful analysis of accidents based 
on the investigations made by the company and hospitals is necessary to completely determine the causes 
for the events. 
Figure 3.b shows the list of possible system hazards, along with examples of potentially flawed control 
actions and inadequate feedback that could lead to violation of safety constraints, which in turn could lead 
to accidents that caused serious injury or death. In each case, the related control loop number (from 
Figure 3.a) is highlighted in parentheses and an example MAUDE report is listed in the last column. 
Control loop 0 refers to higher levels in the control structure, related to the decisions taken and procedures 
performed by the company in the design, manufacturing, and testing process. Tables A5 and A6 
(Appendix) show a specific example of CAST analysis for an adverse event reported in 2008 (MAUDE 
report no. 2240665).  
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                                             (a)                                                                                                                (b) 
System Hazards 
Example Flawed Control Actions and Inadequate Feedback 
(Related Control Loop) 
MAUDE 
Report No. 
The robot instruments/arms move or 
cut or apply energy to an unintended 
position on the patient's body. 
- Inadequate training of the main surgeon or surgical staff  (1) 
- Inaccurate hand movements by the main surgeon (2) 
- Inaccuracy or loss of vision on the surgeon's console (2)   
- Inadequate communication between the surgeon and staff (3) 
- Incorrect commands from the robot control to arms (5) 
1692421 
2563461 
1891889 
2567858 
1077464 
Procedure continues for a prolonged 
time. 
- Inadequate information displayed on surgeon's console (2) 
- Inadequate support and troubleshooting from the company (1) 
- Decisions made by the main surgeon (e.g. use of 2D imaging, 
manual manipulation of arms, not converting) (2) 
2240665 
2494890 
1760256 
1515425 
The robotic console or 
instruments/arms cause shock, 
burning, or fire for the surgical staff. 
- Inadequate safety instructions provided by the company (1) 
- Inadequate safety testing/procedures by the company (0) 
1622530 
1735914 
1633732 
 
 
In the next section, we use the results of the CAST analysis as a basis for spelling out some of the 
challenges in design of  future robotic surgical systsms, and for providing insights on the use of safety 
mechanisms and practices that can improve the safety and effectiveness of robotic surgery.  
 
 
 
Patient
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Human Operators
Robot Control
Translates commands
Displays robot and 
patient status
Robotic Arms and Instruments
3 EndoWrist Instruments
1 Endoscopic Camera
Patient-Side Surgeon/
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Hands, wrists, 
fingers, and feet 
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signals
Image of
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Figure 3 - Causal Analysis using System Theory (CAST) for Example Accidents: 
(a) da Vinci System, Courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., (b) Hierarchical Control Structure of the Robotic Surgical System,  
(c) System Hazards, Example Flawed Controls that led to System Hazards, and Example MAUDE Reports.  
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The da Vinci surgical system was first approved by the FDA and introduced to the market in 2000 for 
performing general minimally-invasive laparoscopic procedures. During the next several years, it was 
approved for various types of surgeries, including urologic, gynecologic, cardiothoracic, head and neck, 
and colorectal. Since then, there have been several studies on the efficacy of the surgical robots in various 
classes of surgery and comparison of the outcomes to those of traditional surgeries such as laparoscopy 
and open surgery (see Table III).  
The da Vinci robot has transformed prostatic and hysterectomy surgeries, with less morbidity, less blood 
loss, and equivalent clinical outcomes compared to open surgery  [24]. However, claims that long-term 
complications will be reduced by better visualization through 3-dimensional magnified views of the 
surgical field and by smaller incisions, have not been borne out  [34]. Also, recent lawsuits have 
highlighted some of the accidents that have occurred during hysterectomy procedures  [1]. The robot could 
make it possible to perform very complex procedures by accessing the body cavity through small ports 
using tele-manipulating arms with 7 degrees of freedom as extensions of the human hand and surgical 
instruments. But the complexity of the robotic platform, the expense of the disposables, the steep learning 
curve, the difficulty in troubleshooting robot system errors, and various patient complications have made 
it difficult to extensively adopt the robot in more complex procedures such as in 
cardiothoracic  [35] [36] [37], head and neck, and colorectal surgeries. As an example, the recently 
published experiences of an extremely competent robotic team that performed multi-vessel coronary 
artery bypass grafting (CABG) showed sub-optimal results (higher mortality and morbidity rates) 
compared to open surgery  [27].  
Major Findings: Based on the experience of different surgical departments and institutions with the 
robot, there have been several reports on malfunctions and failures of robotic surgical systems  [38]– [51]. 
A few others have studied the adverse event reports submitted to the FDA MAUDE database  [52]– [55]. 
Tables A7 and A8 (Appendix) show a summary of the related research. However, most of the previous 
studies targeted two popular surgery classes, gynecology and urology, and analyzed only a subset of 
reports collected by the FDA. The significant results of our study can be summarized as follows: 
 By using a substantially automated language processing tool, we were able to analyze a large set 
of adverse events (4,798) and recalls (19) reported over the 13-year period of 2000–2012, 
including 410 patient injuries and 86 deaths. 
 We found that after nearly 14 years of deployment of da Vinci surgical system, the rate of 
reported adverse events on average is declining, but the average numbers of deaths and injuries 
reported per procedure continue to increase linearly with a rate of 10
-5 
to 10
-6
.  
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 Nearly 91% of the adverse events involved device and instrument malfunctions that caused major 
system downtimes during the surgery because of the need to troubleshoot the problem, by 
resetting the system or converting the procedure to traditional techniques. Examples of 
malfunctions include broken/burnt pieces of instruments falling inside the patient (40.4%), arcing 
of instruments (19.1%), sudden system errors (9.9%), unintended instruments operation (8.8%), 
and video/imaging problems (4.2%).  
 The surgical procedures were interrupted in almost 912 cases (19% of all the adverse events). In 
these cases, some time was spent on either troubleshooting the errors, identifying whether the 
error was actually recoverable or non-recoverable by resetting the system (275 cases, 5.7%), or 
converting the procedure to traditional non-robotic techniques such as open or laparoscopy (640 
cases, 13.3%). In about 5% (236) cases the procedure was rescheduled to a later time.  
 Out of all the adverse events, 659 reports were related to system errors and video/imaging 
problems that were the major contributors to the system resets (84%), or conversion (63.9%), or 
rescheduling of the procedures (80.9%). 
 We were able to establish the relative effectiveness of the robotic surgical system and its 
instruments across different classes of robotic surgery. Surgery classes such as gynecologic and 
urologic where the robots are extensively used, have much lower rates of deaths (2.4% of adverse 
events) than more complex procedures such as head and neck, cardiothoracic, and colorectal, for 
which higher rates of death (17.6%, 11.6%, and 8.8% respectively) and conversions (35.3%, 
25.2%, and 26.5%, respectively) were reported.  
 Through analysis of specific deaths and injuries using CAST accident analysis tool, we concluded 
that the likely potential reason for many of the accidents are the inadequacy of safety controls and 
comprehensive warnings to the surgeon, limited safety and training practices, lack of certification, 
and limited surgical experience. However, additional careful analysis of accidents based on the 
investigations done by the manufacturing company and healthcare facilities is necessary to fully 
understand the causes of the events. 
 
Recommendations: Our systematic accident analysis of representative injury and death reports and 
detailed review of recovery actions taken by the company to address the recalls show that from a 
technology perspective, some of the adverse events could be prevented by employing substantially 
improved safety practices and developing advanced safety mechanisms controls in the design of surgical 
robots. In fact, in other highly safety-critical industries, such as aviation, a great deal of effort has been 
spent over the years to ensure that aircraft are safe and secure.  
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While a direct comparison between aviation and robotic surgery is not possible, we can learn how to 
attain a high level of safety by studying how industry, government, academia, and society came together 
to create standards and procedures that have continually achieved an outstanding safety record and 
mission time reliability of better than 10
-9
 per hour for electronic equipment in commercial aircraft. Some 
of the factors that have been critical to that success include the following (see Table A10, Appendix): 
1) Careful analysis of accidents (by airline authorities and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB)  [56]) to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and designs are continually improved 
2) Extensive use of hazard analysis and sophisticated safety design techniques and controls 
3) Oversight and certification by government authorities such as Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
We believe state-of-the-art technology exists that, if combined with the current robotic technology, can 
make provable and quantifiable improvements to the safety of future systems for robotic surgery. Some 
examples include: 
 Providing real-time visual feedback to the surgeon on the safe trajectories that can be taken  [57], 
by computing the 3D models of the organs under surgery and surrounding critical tissues and 
blood vessels, as well as surgeon-specific models of robotic surgical motions  [58], can minimize 
the risk of approaching dangerous limits and potentially prevent inadvertent patient injuries.   
 While the current systems provide valuable information such as system error codes during the 
procedure, they are very passive in learning from previous failures and providing information on 
troubleshooting. Research in designing new safety engines that provide online monitoring of 
procedures (including surgeon, patient, and device status) and proactive warnings and 
comprehensive feedback to the surgical staff on upcoming events could prevent the long 
downtimes and improve the availability of systems.  
 More detailed analysis of past and future incidents using new accident analysis methods (such as 
Causal Analysis using System Theory (CAST)) as well as safety-driven design using hazard 
analysis techniques (such as System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)) that take into account 
the role of complex software errors, component interaction failures, and human operators will 
help us to design safer devices.  
 Providing improved training and support for surgeons and surgical staff by developing 
certification procedures, improved human-machine interfaces, simulators for surgical training, 
and tools for real-time assessment of skills and expertise of the surgical staff may improve safety 
profiles significantly in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
FDA
MAUDE Database
 2,634,384 Records
Search Query
Date of Event:
   From: 01/01/2000
   To:     01/01/2013
MAUDE 
Records
MDRFOI and FOIDEV Files
MDR Report Key
Brand Name
Generic Name
Manufacturer Name
Baseline brand name
Baseline generic name
Baseline device family 
Device Manufacture Date
Event Date
Report Date
Date FDA Received
4,798 da Vinci Adverse Events 
  1. Report Year
  2. Time to FDA Received 
  3. Event Type (M, I, D, O)
  4. Patient Outcome
  5. Event Description
  6. Manufacturer Narrative
  7. Number of Devices
  8. Class/Type of Surgery
  9. Converted To?  
10. Rescheduled?
11. Malfunctioned Instuments
103 Miss-Reported Injuries
644 System Error Codes
Search terms:
‘da vinci‘,’davinci’, 
and ‘intuitive surgical’
Remove
Duplicate
Cross-match to 
Online Records
4,930
Adverse Event Reports
4,798
Reports
List of da Vinci 
Procedures
www.davincisurgery.com
Categorized Dictionary of 
Keywords related to
Surgery Classes
Intuitive Surgical’s 
Instrument Catalog
Search in the event 
description and 
manufacturer 
narratives to find 
surgery classes, 
malfunctioned 
instruments, 
missed injuries, 
system error codes, 
and converted or 
rescheduled cases
Dictionary of 
Instrument Names
Dictionary of 
injury terms
‘converted’ and 
‘rescheduled’ terms
 
 
 
 Figure A2 - Number of Adverse Events for Different Classes of Surgery: 2000-2012 
Figure A1 - Methodology for Extraction and Analysis of Adverse Events 
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Figure A4 – Intersections between different Malfunction Categories  
(A total of 1,229 adverse event reports were not classified by MedSafe in any of the malfunction categories) 
Figure A3 - Percentage of Converted or Rescheduled Procedures (p < 0.0002) 
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Figure A5 – Intersections between System Resets, Converted, and Rescheduled Cases  
(For 3,886 adverse events no system resets, conversions, or rescheduling was reported.) 
 
Table A1 - Example Malfunction and Errors with Severe Patient Impacts during Cardiothoracic Procedures 
Three of these cases were reported as an event with “Other” patient impact and not as “Injury”. 
MAUDE 
Report 
Number 
( Year) 
Surgery  
Type 
Event 
Faulty 
Component 
Patient Impact Recovery Actions 
444144 
(2003) 
Thoracoscopic 
Ablation for 
AF 
-Injury was noticed as 
surgeon was transferring 
an ablation probe (a non-
isi product) from a long tip 
forceps instrument 
controlled with the right 
hand to another long tip 
forceps controlled with the 
left hand 
N/A 
- Epicardial/tissue 
injury (small hole) 
-Converted to open 
surgery 
 
660137 
(2005) 
Atrial 
Fibrillation 
Treatment 
Atricure ablation electrode 
(isolator transpolar pen) 
was unhooked from 
robotic arm and manually 
manipulated 
N/A 
-Bleeding of arterial 
wall 
-Stroke and aortic 
dissection 
-Cardiopulmonary 
bypass was initiated  
932174 
(2007) 
Mitral Valve 
Repair 
- Possibly port placement 
-The robotic arms were 
never seen to collide but 
this could have occurred 
which resulted in pressure 
on the retractor. 
N/A 
-Left atrial disrupted 
-A 3 cm tear occurred 
in the hood of atrium 
medial to left atrial 
appendage extending 
down towards the 
mitral annulus  
-A patch was brought 
into place, trimmed, 
and was sewn using a 
suture and tied  
-Sternotomy incision 
made for further repair 
1590517 
(2010) 
CABG 
- Micro bipolar forceps 
(mbf) instrument jumped 
forward 
- When master tool 
manipulator was moved, 
the instrument felt stuck 
and then moved. 
Patient side 
manipulator 
(psm) 
 
-Patient's artery 
punctured  
-Damaged section of  
artery was transected 
and the healthy 
portion was used to 
complete the bypass 
-Company replaced 
the psm component 
2494890 
(2012) 
CABG 
- Arcing from Bipolar 
forceps instrument  
N/A 
-Small burn to 
diaphragm 
-Connected ground 
pads and checked 
electrical surgical unit 
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Table A2 - Example Error Codes and Related Safety Mechanisms of da Vinci System 
System 
Error 
Code 
Description 
Type of  
Safe State 
that System 
Transits To 
No. of 
Adverse 
Events 
#20008 
The angular position of one or more robotic joint's on the specified 
manipulator, as measured by the joint's primary control sensor (encoder) and 
the secondary sensor (potentiometer), were out of specified tolerance for 
agreement 
Recoverable 
62 
#23008 42 
#20013 34 
#23013 20 
#21008 18 
#21013 17 
#23002 8 
#20009 7 
#22003 5 
#212 
A voltage tracking fault reported by the digital signal processor (dsp): When 
the actual voltage to drive current through the motors deviates from the 
expected voltage by a specified amount. 
Non-recoverable 31 
#23 
-Hardware wheel "wdog" has tripped on one of the digital communication links 
in the system (due to an excessive number of retries on hardware message 
packets). This means that the system cannot reliably communicate over that 
digital link and therefore cannot continue normal operation. 
- Communication faults in the low voltage differential signal carrying 
information about the patient side manipulator. 
- Communication faults between two system components. 
N/A 28 
#1 A power supply voltage was out of range. Non-recoverable 19 
#3 
A redundant switch was missing its ground sense, or the contacts did not report 
as expected at startup 
N/A 15 
#23017 
A motor did not respond as expected and the measured motion did not match 
the internal stimulation of the motor. 
Recoverable 14 
#2 A reference voltage was out of range N/A 14 
#31030 
One of the camera controller units in the doco has failed to power on after 
multiple attempts or has shut down after initially powering up. 
N/A 14 
#5 One or more fans are not moving as desired N/A 10 
#297 An electronic component was reporting an incorrect configuration. Non-recoverable 9 
#252 
Master supervisory controller does not receive an expected message within a 
specified time. 
Recoverable 8 
#23020 
One of the switches in an specific manipulator is showing inconsistent signals 
on it's two switch leads. 
Recoverable 7 
#25589 
During the power up self-test, the remote arm controller board (rac) brakes 
failed the brake voltage test. 
Recoverable 6 
#25588 
A sympathetic error and occurs during the self-test upon system power up 
when a loop response test fails. 
Recoverable 6 
#23007 
On startup, one or more robotic joints on the manipulator did not make the 
prescribed test motion to within the specified tolerance. 
Recoverable 6 
#21003 
The arm did not perform the commanded motions during startup within a 
specified tolerance 
N/A 5 
#281 
A processor did not complete a step during system startup within the allotted 
time 
Non-recoverable 5 
#23034 
After a specified amount of time, a valid event has not been seen for one of the 
remote compute engine switches 
Recoverable 5 
#45049 
A communication timeout with the software running the da vinci onsite 
application 
Recoverable 4 
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Table A3 – Example Recalls of da Vinci da Vinci (S) Accessories (Years 2000-2012) 
Recall 
Record 
Numbers 
Device Name 
(Model Number) 
Date 
Malfunction 
Type 
Reason for Recall 
Company 
Recovery 
Action N
u
m
. 
o
f 
D
ev
ic
es
 
Z-0660-2007 
8mm EndoWrist 
Bipolar Maryland 
Instrument 
Mar 
28 
2007 
Computer 
Software 
The product was incorrectly 
programmed as training 
instruments, allowing it to be 
used for 30 surgical procedures 
instead of 10. 
Urgent Letter 
+ 
Return 
8 
Z-1811-2008 
da Vinci S 
Cardiac Probe 
Gasper Instrument 
(For model IS2000) 
Sep 
17 
2008 
There is a software interface 
problem that will not allow the 
IS2000 system to recognize the 
instrument, which causes the 
loss of operability of the 
instrument; delay in surgery; and 
loss of dexterity. 
Urgent Letter 
+ 
Return 
11 
Z-0723-05 
da Vinci 
8 mm 
EndoWrist 
Curved Scissors 
Apr 
22 
2005 
Mechanical 
Blades on the scissor may break 
and separate from the main unit 
as a result of corrosion damage. 
Notification 
Letter 
278 
Z-0669-2008 
da Vinci S 
5 mm 
Instrument Cannula 
Jan 
31 
2008 
5mm Cannula may have  sharp 
edges on the inner diameter that 
may cause particulate shavings 
to be skive (scraping) from the 
instrument shafts during surgery. 
Urgent 
Notification 
Letter 
+ 
Instructions 
89 
Z-0657-2008 
Z-0658-2008 
Z-0659-2008 
Jan 
31 
2008 
There may be a ridge on the side 
of the cannula which has the 
potential to abrade instrument 
shafts and generate black 
particulate matter. 
Urgent 
Notification 
Letter 
+ 
Replace 
896 
Z-1348-2008 
da Vinci S 
8mm 
Instrument Cannula 
(For model IS2000) 
Aug
06 
2008 
(1) Incorrect dimension on Luer 
on smoke evacuation cannulae 
not allowing for secure 
attachment function. (2) 
Incorrect labeling. 
Urgent Letter 
+ 
Remove 
39 
Z-2104-2012 
Z-2103-2012 
Z-2101-2012 
Z-2102-2012 
Z-2105-2012 
Z-2106-2012 
da Vinci S 
4 Arm 
Disposable 
Accessory Kit 
(For model IS3000) 
Jul 
27 
2012 
Specific lots of the Instrument 
Arm Drapes were manufactured 
with a sterile adaptor that may 
have difficulty engaging an 
instrument. 
Urgent 
Recall Letter 
+ 
Return 
92,390 
Z-0258-2008 
da Vinci 
8 mm 
EndoWrist 
PK Dissecting 
Forceps 
Jan 
24 
2008 Labeling 
and 
Sterilization 
Mislabeling-electrical isolation 
requirements: devices were 
incorrectly labeled with a CF 
symbol (suitable for direct 
cardiac application), not their 
proper BF Symbol on the 
instrument housing.  
Urgent Letter 
+ 
Instructions 
+ 
Update 
Labeling 
1,136 
Z-2339-2012 
Tip Cover for 
8m  Monopolar 
Curved Scissors 
(Disposable) 
Sep 
10 
2012 
There is potential for the sterility 
of the product to be 
compromised. 
Notification 
Letter 
+ 
Instructions 
11,121 
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Table A4 - Example Death Adverse Event Reports 
MAUDE 
Report 
Number 
Date 
Report 
Received 
Event Description Summary Surgery Type 
Surgery  
Class 
Reason 
2563461 
May 
2012 
The surgeon cut the patient's iliac artery and 
vein while performing node dissection, causing 
bleeding from those vessels. A hemo-clip was 
applied to the affected area, however, the clip 
tore through the area causing significant 
hemorrhage from the pelvic vessels. The 
surgical procedure was converted to open 
laparotomy techniques. The patient expired. 
Hysterectomy Gynecologic 
Staff  
Mistake 
2567858 
May 
2012 
Approximately 45 minutes into a procedure 
when the assistant at the patient side cart (psc) 
performed a tool change to switch the 
instruments in the patient side manipulator 
(psm) arms, the patient's aorta was punctured. 
The procedure was converted to traditional open 
surgery. The patient was in stable condition right 
after the procedure however expired the 
following day. 
N/A N/A 
2066439 
Apr. 
2011 
After a mitral valve repair procedure, the 
patient's blood pressure had dropped due to a 
leak in the mitral valve. A sternotomy was 
performed to repair of the valve; however, the 
patient expired before the repair. 
 
Mitral  
Valve  
Repair 
Cardiothoracic 
Surgery 
Complica
tions 
2105804 
May 
2011 
During a procedure to remove the lower lobe of 
left lung due to bronchioloalveolar carcinoma, 
the patient's stomach and diaphragm were 
punctured resulting in sepsis. 
The patient underwent a 5 month hospital stay 
and eighteen months as a near invalid and then 
expired. 
Remove 
Lung 
Cardiothoracic 
2539834 
Apr. 
2012 
During placement of the uterine manipulator, the 
patient's bowel was ruptured. The surgeon 
repaired the patient's bowel, but post op. patient 
experienced cardiovascular complications and 
expired (demise attributed to a t-berg).  
Bilateral 
Salpingo-
oophorectomy  
Gynecologic 
2890369 
 
Dec.  
2012 
A tenaculum forceps instrument was not moving 
as it should. No patient harm, adverse outcome 
or injury was reported to have occurred during 
the procedure. However, after the surgery 
patient was re-admitted to the hospital due to a 
perforated bowel and expired. 
Myomectomy Gynecologic 
Potential 
Technical  
Issues 
2746253 
Sep. 
2012 
The surgeon experienced visualization problems 
due to the patient's anatomy. After several hours 
the procedure was converted to traditional open 
surgery. During the open procedure a rectal 
laceration was discovered, and an emergency 
repair was performed. The patient experienced 
heavy blood loss and was transported to an 
intensive care unit and later to a rehabilitation 
center and eventually expired from cardiac 
arrest. 
Prostatectomy Urologic 
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Table A5 – Example Adverse Event Reports: MDR Report No.: 2240665 
Event Date: 07/17/2008 
Event Type: Injury 
Patient Outcome: Required Intervention, Life Threatening 
Event Description: This report is being filed based an isi investigation concluding 08/08/2008. (b)(4) was received 
on 08/01/2008 from the (b)(6). It was reported that during da vinci s bilateral internal mammary arteries 
revascularization procedure, the customer experienced a system error code #23. With the assistance of an isi (b)(4), 
the site powered down the system to clear the fault. The site continued with the procedure, however, the system 
error reoccurred. The site disabled the endoscopic camera manipulator (ecm) to continue the case. The site then 
elected to manually manipulate the camera and endoscope for approximately 5 to 6 hours when a loss of carbon 
dioxide insufflation occurred resulting in the heart pushing up into the endoscope two times causing lacerations to 
the patient's right ventricle. The procedure was converted to a thoracotomy to performed a non robotic repair of the 
damaged ventricle with several stitches and to complete the planned procedure. After the 14 hour procedure, the 
patient could not be extubated necessitating a tracheostomy. As of (b)(6), the patient remained under care at (b)(6). 
Manufacturer Narrative: The investigation conducted by (b)(4) concluded that the system error code #23 
experienced by the customer was associated with a configured embedded sterilizer setup joint (cfg, essj) and remote 
arm controller (rac). The embedded sterilizer for setup-joint is the printed circuit assembly (pca) inside a system arm 
that monitors the potentiometer for each of four joints and their associated backup potentiometers. The rac consists 
of five printed circuit assembly boards which operate together to provide control of the system arms. The system 
was repaired by replacing the affected cfg, essj and rac. System error code #23 is reported by software to denote that 
the hardware wheel "wdog" has tripped on one of the digital communication links in the system. This means that the 
system cannot reliably communicate over the digital link and therefore cannot continue normal operation. 
Communication faults occasionally occur due to typically either faulty electronics or poor connections in the 
communication link. The error 23 fault indicated by the system in this case pointed to a communication error 
involving the ecm's rac and essj modules. The system was repaired as the (b)(4) both removed the electronics that 
could have experienced an intermittent failure and re-secured all of the connections involved. Field experience has 
shown that these measures are effective in resolving this type of system communication issue. As of (b)(6) 2007, the 
site has continued to use the system and has not reported recurrences of this issue. 
Brand Name: DA VINCI S SURGICAL SYSTEM 
Type of Device: ENDOSCOPIC INSTRUMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 
Manufacturer: INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC. 
Report Date: 08/11/2008 
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Table A6 – CAST Analysis for Example Adverse Event Report of Table A6 
Violated Safety Constraints: 
• Robot instruments/arms should not move or cut or apply energy to an unintended position on the patient's body: 
– Heart pushed up to the endoscope two times. 
• Procedure should not continue for a prolonged time: 
– Procedure continued for 14 hours. 
Physical Robot: 
• Safety Requirements and Constraints (Possibly) Violated: 
– Inform the main surgeon and staff of robot emergency status and corresponding recovery procedures. 
– Prevent uncoordinated manipulation of arms and instruments. 
– Inform the main surgeon and staff of the status of organ under surgery. 
• Failures and Inadequate Controls: 
– Inadequate information was displayed about the system error to the main surgeon. 
– Inadequate instructions/procedures were provided on how to resolve the system error. 
– No control for the manual manipulation of endoscope arm. 
– Inadequate information was displayed on distance between organ and instrument.  
• Physical Contextual Factors 
– The system error code was due to an electronic component failure and was not cleared by system resetting. 
– The loss of carbon dioxide caused the organ push up to the endoscopic camera. 
– The patient could not be extubated necessitating a tracheostomy.  
Nurse/Patient-side Surgeon: 
• Safety Related Responsibilities 
– Monitor status of patient and robot and communicate it to main surgeon. 
– Monitor the status of other required devices such as insufflation device.  
• Contextual Factors: 
– Under stress to finish the surgery safely 
– Fatigued after 5-6 hours of surgery  
• (Possibly) Unsafe Decisions and Control Actions 
– No coordination with main surgeon on the status of insufflation device?  
– No feedback to the main surgeon about the organ pushing up to the instrument?   
• (Possible) Process Model Flaws 
– Believed that insufflation device is working fine? 
– Believed that main surgeon will know about loss of carbon dioxide?  
– Believed that main surgeon sees the status of organ through the console?  
Main Surgeon: 
• Safety Safety Related Responsibilities 
– Perform the main surgery actions by moving manipulators on the console safely.  
– Communicate with the company to get feedback or troubleshoot problems. 
– Send commands to the assistant surgeon/nurse during the surgery.  
– Monitor the time of surgery and decide on the best time to convert or stop the procedure. 
• Context 
– Under stress to finish the surgery safely, fatigued after 5-6 hours of surgery 
– Cardiothoracic surgeons usually not very skilled with laparoscopic type of surgery 
– Loss of objectivity: Determined to finish the robotic surgery? 
• (Possibly) Unsafe Decisions and Control Actions 
– No follow-up with the company to let them know that the error not cleared after resetting the device.  
– Manual manipulation of camera and endoscope for 5-6 hours. 
– Changing to the conventional surgery very late, not keeping track of time  
• (Possible) Process Model Flaws 
– Believed the surgery could be finished more efficiently by manual manipulation of instruments. 
Safety Recommendations: 
• The surgeon console should provide more detailed information about the system errors, including the 
procedures to troubleshoot the problem and recommendations on safest actions to take to resolve the error. 
• The robotic system should keep track of time spent on the surgery and the surgeon's actions such as manual 
manipulation of arms and provides warnings based on surgery type, patient's history, and surgeon's experience. 
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Table A7 – Related Works on Failure Rates and Malfunctions of da Vinci Surgical Systems 
Ref. 
No. 
Year 
Surgery Types Medical Institute  
No.  
of 
Cases 
Total Number of Failures (Failure Rate) 
Types of Malfunctions 
Converted  Rescheduled 
 [38] 
2005 
Urologic UC Irvine 200  
Total = 5 (2.5%) 
Software (4), Mechanical (1) 
N/A N/A 
 [39] 
2006 
Radical  
Prostatectomy 
(RLRP) 
Virginia Mason  
Medical Center 
(VMMC) 
130 
Total = 6 (4.6%) 
Setup joint (2), Software Incomp. (1), 
Robotic arm (1), Power-off (1),  
Monitor loss (1) 
Laparoscopic (1)  
Open (1) 
1 
 [40] 
2007 
Laparoscopic 
Prostatectomy 
Virginia Mason  
Medical Center 
(VMMC) 
350 
Total = 9 (2.6%) 
Setup joint (2), Robotic arm (1), Camera (1), 
Power error (1), Console metal break (1), 
Software Incomp. (1), Monitor loss (1) 
Laparoscopic/ 
Open (3) 
6 
 [41] 
2007 
Radical  
Prostatectomy  
(RLRP) 
University of 
Chicago  
Pritzker School of 
Medicine 
(2003-2006) 
725 
Total = 7  
(Recover. = 0.21%, Non-Recover. =.05%) 
Power up failure (1), Optical malfunction 
(3), Surgeon Handicap (3), Robotic arm (1), 
Camera (2) 
 
-Completed (3) 
4 
 [42] 
2008 
Radical  
Prostatectomy 
Klinik Hirslanden, 
Zurich, Switzerland 
210 
Total = 2 (1%) 
Robotic arm (2) 
Conventional 
Laparoscopic 
N/A 
 [43] 
2008 
Radical  
Laparoscopic 
Prostatectomy  
(RALP) 
11 Institutions 
700 Surgeons 
8240 
34 critical failures (0.4%) 
Robotic arm (14), Optical system (14) 
Masters (4), Power supply/circuit (6), 
Unknown error (3) 
Laparoscopic(2) 
Open (8) 
24 
 [44] 
2009 
Radical  
Laparoscopic 
Prostatectomy 
Yonsei University 
College of 
Medicine, Korea 
1 Case report of Surgeon’s console failure Delayed 15 min  
 [45] 
2009 
Urology, 
General Surgery, 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, 
Thoracic Surgery, 
Cardiac Surgery, 
Otorhinolaryngology 
Yonsei University 
College of 
Medicine, Korea 
 
(2005-2008) 
1797 
Total = 43 (2.4%) 
-Robot failures (24):On/off failure (1), 
Console malfunction (5), Robotic arm (6), 
Optic system (2), System error (10) 
-Instrument failures (19): Shaft injuries 
(9), Wire cutting (2), Un-natural motion (2), 
Instrument tip (2), Limitation in motion (1) 
Laparoscopic/ 
Open (3) 
 
 
 
N/A 
 [46] 
2010 
Robotic  
Laparoscopic Radical 
Prostatectomy  
Yonsei University 
College of 
Medicine, Korea 
1 
Case report of mechanical malfunction of an 
instrument (4
th
 arm) 
Laparoscopic 
(225 min) 
N/A 
 [47] 
2010 
Robot-assisted  
Radical  
Prostatectomy 
(RARP) 
Survey of 
176 Surgeons from  
4 Countries 
 
N/A 
Total failures = 260 
Robotic arm (38%), Camera (17.6%) 
Setup joint (13.8%), Power error (8.8%), 
Ocular monitor loss(8%), Instruments 
(7.6%), Console handpiece break (3%), 
Software (1.9%), Backup battery (0.3%), 
Instrument identification (0.3%) 
Open (18.8%), 
Laparoscopic 
(15%) 
Another robot, 
with one less 
robotic arm 
(8.7%) 
57.5% 
 [48] 
2010 
Gynecologic  
Oncology 
Mitchell Cancer 
Institute, University 
of South Alabama 
(2006-2008) 
137 
Total = 11 (8.02%) 
Robotic arm (2), Light or camera cord(2), 
Maylard bipolar (1), Power failure (1), Port 
problem (1),Others(3) 
Delayed 25 min 
 
N/A 
 [49] 
2011 
Urology, 
Gynecology, 
Cardiothoracic,  
General surgery,  
Otolaryn- gology, 
Neurosurgery 
Ohio State 
University Medical 
Center, 
James Cancer 
Hospital 
(2008-2009) 
454 
Tip cover failures = 12 (2.6%) 
Significant patient complications (25%) 
 
Repaired at the 
time of surgery 
N/A 
 [50] 
2012 
General  
Surgery 
Cleveland Clinic 223 
Total = 10 (4.5%) 
Robotic instrument (4), Optical system (3), 
Robotic arms (2), Robotic console (1) 
 
Open surgery (6) 
N/A 
 [51] 
2012 
Urological 
Surgery 
Veterans General 
Hospital, Taiwan 
(2005-2011) 
400 
Total = 14 (3.5%) 
Robotic arm/joint (11), Optical system (1), 
Power system (1), Endoscopic instrument 
(1), Software incomp. (1) 
Completed (10), 
Laparoscopy (3) 
1 
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Table A8 – Summary of Related Works on Analysis of MAUDE Data for Robotic Surgical Systems 
Andonian et al. found an estimated failure rate of 0.38% for robotic-assisted laparoscopic surgeries by 
reviewing 189 adverse events related to the ZEUS and the da Vinci surgical robotic systems, reported to 
the MAUDE database between the years 2000-2007  [52]. Murphy et al identified 38 system failures and 
78 adverse events related to da Vinci robotic system, reported between 2006 and 2007, most of which 
were related to broken instrument tips or failure of electrocautery elements  [53]. Lucas et al compared the 
rates of adverse events in two different models of da Vinci surgical systems (dVs and dV) during the 
period of 2003-2009 and showed that both device malfunctions and open conversions were reduced by 
increased robotic experience and newer surgical systems  [54]. Finally, Fuller et al. reviewed 605 adverse 
events of da Vinci system during 2001-2011, and identified 24 (3.9%) reports related to electrosurgical 
injuries (ESI) that occurred during gynecological and prostatectomy procedures  [55]. 
 
Table A9 – Example Complex Robotic Interactions with Possible Failure Modes 
1) A surgeon or surgical assistant needs to be by the patient’s side, inserting the ports/scope/instruments 
2) The main surgeon sits at a console some distance away from the patient, with no peripheral vision, and 
so does not get to see the manipulation of the arms in and around the patient. 
3) Any change of instrumentation requires a pause in proceedings, as the patient side surgeon stops and 
changes instruments. Once the instrument is docked in the port, registered and secured, the procedure 
can be resumed from where it was stopped. Each of these instrument changes takes about 30 secs- 2 
mins, so if there are 10 instrument changes in a case, that add 20 minutes to the total time of 
procedure.   
4) There is no tactile feedback or haptics. Several of the adverse events reported inadvertent injury to the 
aorta, right ventricle, lungs, etc.  Sometimes, vessels have been ripped because of lack of feel and the 
force delivered by the grasping forceps might significantly exceed safe limits. 
5) The field of vision is very limited to the scope and it can be easy to get disoriented, both in terms of 
horizon and the location within the body.  
6) Visualization requires insufflation of carbon di-oxide at a high flow of 6-10 Litres/minute. While this 
is done in laparoscopy, it is usually not at such a high flow. This high flow of CO2 can result in it 
being absorbed and this can cause significant metabolic derangements that affect the heart. 
7) Each instrument is allowed to be used only 10 times, after which software shut down occurs, driving 
up the costs and making instruments also part of the disposable costs. In open and laparoscopic 
surgeries some disposable instruments are used but they are not as expensive as robotic instruments. 
8) There is an obligatory setup time, in addition to longer operative times with the robot.  Robotic 
procedures in all fields of surgery take longer than open or laparoscopic procedures. 
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Table A10 - Comparison between Two Safety-Critical Industries: Aviation vs. Robotic Surgery 
 Aviation Robotic Surgery 
Operation: 
Type 
Device 
Targets 
 
Semi-autonomous 
Airplanes 
Passengers 
 
Semi-autonomous 
Robots 
Patients 
Age 80 years (approx. 1934)  < 20 years (approx. 1999) 
Certification: 
Administrated by: 
-Device 
-Operator 
-Others 
 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
-Aircraft certified under 14 CFR 121 
-Pilots certified by privilege levels 
-Crew certified by airlines 
 
Food and Drug Administration  (FDA) 
-Robot approved by 510K 
-Surgeons trained but not certified 
-Staff trained but not certified  
Training Required by FAA for pilots  Provided by company for surgeons 
Accidents All accidents investigated by NTSB and 
other authorities based on the evidence 
collected from the site of accident 
Reported by the users and company to the 
FDA MAUDE database, on a voluntary basis 
Safety Hazards 
 
-Natural: Weather conditions, fire, etc. 
-Mechanical/Electrical: Engine, 
electromagnetic interference, etc. 
-Humans: Incorrect info by control center, 
pilot/crew errors, passenger misuses, 
hijacking 
-Natural: Patient history/condition/procedure 
-Mechanical/Electrical: Arm malfunctions, 
system errors, etc. 
-Humans: Incorrect info by the company for 
setup/troubleshooting, pilot/staff mistake, etc. 
 
 
 
